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Abstract
Denial of service attacks, distributed denial of service attacks and reflector attacks are well known and
documented events. More recently these attacks have been directed at game stations and mobile
communication devices as strategies for disrupting communication. In this paper we ask, How can slow
DDos attacks be detected? The similarity metric is adopted and applied for potential application. A short
review of previous literature on attacks and prevention methodologies is provided and strategies are
discussed. An innovative attack detection method is introduced and the processes and procedures are
summarized into an investigation process model. The advantages and benefits of applying the metric
are demonstrated and the importance of trace back preparation discussed.
Keywords Slow DDoS, Detection, Mobile Devices, Metrics
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1 Introduction
The lower bandwidth of mobile devices has prevented many of the more sophisticated attacks that are
found on the Internet disrupting services. However, as the global proliferation of mobile device
continues to expand with handsets and other communication devices, and attackers are finding ways to
infiltrate. One of the more recent mobile phone attacks has been the slow DDOS attack that carefully
obscures its tracks by fitting within the bandwidth on a time-based calculation. The attack slowly builds
up momentum through compromised nodes and can become very costly for a user. These attacks create
irritation for the end user by disrupting services but these disruptions and delays also create economic
advantage for the service suppliers. The detection of these attacks requires new measures. In this paper
we explore with dummy data from a mobile phone attack, the potential of the inter-similarity metric.
The metric shows that it can quickly aggregate variations in log files over extended periods of time to
identify patterns and consistencies that can disclose an attacker. The purpose of this is not only to alert
the event but also to provide evidence in order to trace back to the attacker.
Cisco in Bailey et al. (2009) reported that smart devices were responsible for generating 14 times more
traffic than a non-smart device. As a result, the cellular networks have made tremendous improvements
in order to meet the demands for increased band with and QoS (Anstee et al., 2013). According to Farina
et al. (2016), the 4G connections is responsible for generating six times more traffic than non 4G
connections in 2015. However, globally, mobile data traffic reached 3.7 Exabyte per month in 2015;
making mobile data traffic grow 4,000-fold over the past 10 years and almost 400-million-fold over the
past 15 years. Smart devices represented 36 percent of mobile device connections globally in 2015. This
accounted for 89 percent of mobile data traffic in which 55 percent was mobile video traffic. The average
smartphone usage grew 43 percent in 2015. It is unambiguous in the literature that the cellular network
will be the backbone that provides connectivity to a large amount of connected devices with various
capabilities. It has ultra-high reliability but also a growing number of vulnerabilities (Chen & Song,
2005). Increasing demand from network users’ for pervasive connectivity generates a demand for
dynamic mobile networking. This also drives the growth in the development and usage of various mobile
and wireless applications such as audio/video conferencing, distance learning, e-commerce, and
distributed and multiparty games (Fernand et al., 2007). It has also led into an integration of various
service infrastructures in order to provide all these services to users. As a result, cellular technologies
will be the backbone to create connectivity to various devices and applications requirements. The wide
variety of requirements carry new challenges to the cellular networks. Creating an architecture that can
comprise performance, flexible functionality and security for the future connected industries is a
challenge (Chen & Song, 2005). The characterization reveal by Network Science regarding the Cellular
network and public switched telephone network: Relative Maturity is ranked High; Technology Intensity
also ranked High; Societal Impacts/Benefits is ranked High and Societal Impact of Catastrophic Failure
is ranked high as well (Deka et al., 2015).
For that reason, researchers in the field have been studying and developing various techniques to protect
and prevent attacks on such network infrastructure (Arun et al., 2013). Real world systems can be
represented by complex networks such as, social networks, communication networks, biological
networks (Goodrich, 2008), (Gulisano et al., 2015), technological, transportation (Guo & Lee, 2010) and
sociological (Guliisano et al., 2015). There structural complexity, and network evolution due to
technological changes and connection diversity, are complex (Hendiks et al., 2014). A Complex network
is defined as a large collection of interconnected nodes, where anything can be a node. For instance a
person, an organization, a computer, a biological cell, and so forth. When Interconnected then two
people know each other or two computers have a link connecting them for the purpose of passing
information. These systems are considered complex because they are large and impossible to
understand or predict their behavior. Due to the complex nature of these systems/networks, graph
theory provides visualisation for the combination of switches and links that form a communication
network (Hazeyama et al., 2003). This work focusses on assessing the vulnerabilities of the cellular
communication network structure to a random or intentional attack; which can trigger the process of
cascading failures. The criticality application of the similarity metric exploits the availability of log files
and the relative spatial discrepancies between traffic expectations and abnormalities.

2 Previous Literature
Distributed Denial of Service (DDOS) is a type of Denial of Service (DOS) attack where an attacker
infected a large number of systems with malicious software to gain control. The attacker then utilized
those compromised systems to launch an attack on the targeted system (Robinson and Thomas, 2012,
p.713). The purpose of DoS/DDoS is to flood the target system or service with a large number of requests.
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This will eventually force it to shut down, in this manner, denying access to legitimate users (Chen and
Song, 2005, p.526). Successful DDoS attack achieves two objectives, overpowering the victim’s system
and concealing the attacker’s identity. Therefore, it is vital to monitor the characteristics of DDoS, as
early detection of any variance to the system’s normal activities can significantly increase the chance of
preventing it and prioritizing them more accurately. The three components that researchers in the field
are currently working on our detection, tracing back the origin of an attack, and preventing/defending
(Robinson and Thomas, 2012, p.713).
The DDoS technique is very hard to detect and identify because it can be launched from hundreds or
thousands of compromised nodes over the Internet. In this nature of attack, it also makes it hard to
distinguish between legitimate network traffic and DDoS attack traffic. However, the vast variety of
attacks in cyberspace indicate that the problem area is also vast and may very well be hard to conduct
an exploratory study (Mirkovic and Reiher, 2004, p.39). DDoS has been further developed into a new
type of DoS known as Low-rate DDoS. With this type of DDoS, attackers can now launch an attack using
mobile SMART devices such as SMART phones. Last known report of this type of attack was reported
by Murdock (2015) which involved 650,000 SMART phones. In the body of knowledge it is evident that
there have been studies in this field trying to enhance the detection, mitigation and trace back
mechanisms (Yu, 2014c, p.31). It is also evident that this type of cyber-attack is a major and continuous
threat in cybersecurity (Yu, 2014b, p.1).
In the literature reviewed for this paper, it is evident that the main problem with DoS and DDoS attacks
is the fact that, they are hard to detect, prevent/defend and trace back to the origin. The new generation
of mobile communication has meant that we are now having mobile access to the wealth of information
and services. Even though that its benefit is acknowledged but, a concerned is noted due to the
proliferation of mobile technologies available (Serra and Venter, 2011, p.2). The advancement in the
functionalities of technologies such as web-servers and cellular networks has enabled various
applications to interact with each other. The advancement has also opened new opportunities in terms
of security threats. For instance, attacks on mobile devices and cellular networks (Meyer and Penzhorn,
2004, p.20). Security researchers’ stated that Smart devices now represent a particular risk. They
function like computers, provide Internet connectivity from anywhere at any time and they can
download applications or files, some could carry malicious code. Security experts are finding a growing
number of viruses, worms and Trojan horses that target mobile devices. Security researchers argued
that before long, hackers could infect mobile devices with malicious software (Leavitt, 2005, p.20).
Over the past decade, mobile devices have always been a victim of an attack such as data exfiltration as
mobile devices contains large amount of probative information that can be linked to an individual
(Kasiaras, et al., 2014, p.157). Today, processing and computational power of mobile devices is similar
to that of a desktop computer and its potential to carry out offensive attacks on computer systems and
services is certainly possible (Farina, et al., 2016, p.281). It is evident in the current literature that the
usage of mobile devices is still increasing. As a result, they can constitute a target attack but are also an
effective tool for launching distributed attacks such as a mobile botnet one (Farina, et al., 2014, p.385).
Detection, prevention and trace back are the three main areas of DDoS that researchers are focusing on.

3 DOS/DDOS Topologies
There are different known network topologies for DoS/DDoS attack. However, the structure employed
for a particular attack only depends on the attacker’s preference.
A denial-of-service (DoS) attack is defined as an attempt to make a service such as a server or network
unavailable to legitimate users by flooding it with attack packets. It’s an attack on availability and there
are four main DoS attack methods (Panko and Boyle, 2013, p.37).
Victim

Internet
Attacker

Figure 1: DoS topology (adopted from Panko and Boyle, 2013, p.37)
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First is single source against single target (SSST) and second is and multiple sources against single target
(MSST) (Xiuzhen, et al., 2011, p.221). The third method is named by Panko and Boyle (2013) as reflected
and the fourth is sending malformed packets (p.198).
According to Yu (2014b), there two different types of DDoS attack structure – the typical DDoS attack
and the Distributed Reflection Denial of Service (DRDoS) attack (p.3).
Command
& Control
Communication
Traffics

bot

bot

bot

Victim

Figure 2: Typical DDoS topology (adopted from Yu, 2014b, p.4)
Figure 2 showed the network topology for a typical DDoS attack. In this environment, the attacker sends
the command message to the command and control server to activate attack processes on all the bots
(Yu, 2014b, p.5). The difference between the typical DDoS and the DRDoS is that, in DRDoS attack, the
bot is control by the command and control centre.
Command
& Control
Communication
Traffics

bot

bot

bot
Attack
Traffics

reflector

reflector

reflector
Attack
Traffics

Victim

Figure 3: DRDoS topology (adopted from Yu, 2014b, p.5)

The bots send out stream of packets to the reflectors using the victim’s IP address as the source
address in the packet’s header. As a result, the reflectors will flood the victim’s system with
respond traffics to what they believe a legitimate requests coming from the victim.
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Master

Handlers

Agents

Victim

Figure 4: Constituents of DDoS (adopted from Deshmukh and Devadkar, 2015, p.204)
This architecture takes advantage of the client server technology. The Master forms the botnet by using
the agents or bots and this known as the Zombies. The Master communicates with the Zombies via the
Handlers. For instance, the Master sends out control commands to the Zombies via the Handlers (Singh,
et al., 2016, p.112). Zombies are the nodes that are compromised by the Handlers, An attacker can
compromise systems by scanning for vulnerabilities in the system. There are a number scanning
techniques that an attacker can use such as Uniform scan worms, Hit list worm or the Routing worm
(Zou, et al., 2006, p.702). Due to the rapid development in communication technologies, smart devices
now can access the Internet via various wireless technologies such as Wi-FI, 3G, LTE or WiMax etc
(Farina, et al., 2014, p.385). As a result, hackers can see the capabilities of engaging these devices in
criminal activities. In the case of engaging these devices in a DDoS attack, specific malicious software
such as worm or spyware is developed as means of creating a botnets to perform an attack (DDoS) attack
(Stafford and Urbaczewski, 2004, p.297).
The network architecture in figure 5 showed that the attacker can use Wi-Fi network to create a botnet
and launch an attack using the cellular network.
Edge router

Attacker

Internet

Handlers

Smart
Devices

Smart
Phone

Smart
Phone

Smart
Phone

Smart
Phone

Router

Smart
Phone

Agents

Victim

Figure 5: Mobile device DDoS topology (adopted from Hadiks, et al., 2014, p.507)

4 Proposed Method for Detection & Traceback
There have been known security incidents of DDoS involving Mobile devices. For instance, September
2015, researchers from CloudFlare reported that a DDoS attack peaked at over 275,000 HTTP requests
per second and resulted in 4.5 billion hits on the targeted website. This was blamed on a malicious

5

Australasian Conference on Information Systems
2016, Wollongong

Cusack, Lutui, Khaleghparast
Attacks on Mobile Devices

advertising that compromised up to 650,000 Smartphones (Murdock, 2015, p.1). Various entities come
together to create a cellular network and are grouped together based on their functions and interface
requirements. As a result, these are divided into four main components: The Mobile Station (MS), The
Base Station Subsystem (BSS), The Network and Switching Subsystem (NSS) and The Operation and
Support Subsystem (OSS) (Androulidakis and Basios, 2008, p.465).
The vision of the 3G technologies is to use the IP technologies for control and transport. This cross
network service collaborations will introduce a multi-vendor, multi-domain environment in order to
gratify a wide variety of needs. This relationship will need to use Internet-based data and data from the
cellular network in order to provide services to wireless users (Kotapati, et al., 2005, p.631). This new
venture between these two different technologies introduces new vulnerabilities and exposes the users
on the cellular network to a range of additional risks such as the DoS/DDoS attacks (Ricciato, et al.,
2010, p.553).The introduction and growth of usages of technologies such as 4G/LTE and its high
bandwidth has increased the pervasiveness nature of access points to the network. It is therefore evident
mobile devices constitute not only a new target of an attack but its capability to execute an attack (Farina,
et al., 2016, p.269). Contact list stored on mobile devices can be used to spread the malware and infect
other devices (Plohmann, et al., 2011, p.133). A DoS/DDoS attack has evolved from flood to low
bandwidth rate based also known as Slow DoS, Low-Rate DoS, Low Bandwidth Rate (LBR) DoS or
application DoS. The purpose of this Slow DoS technique is to lower the amount of bandwidth and
resources that are required to execute an attack. This new technique has been adopted and used in
devices such as mobile phone (Cambiaso, et al., 2012, p.195). While most of the packets send to the
target node in a flooding DoS attack may be useless but, in a low-rate attack, almost all of the packets
play a role in the success of the attack. Therefore, the low-rate DoS will force the victim to process only
the attack packets. There is not yet an effective taxonomy to address an efficient detection method in
relation to slow-rate DoS (Cambiaso, et al., 2012, p.197). In this paper, the focus is on a technique to
detect this kind of attack on mobile devices and also the use of digital forensics method to trace back the
attack to its origin.

4.1 Distance Based Similarity Metric for Detection of Low-Rate DDoS Attack
Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) is simple but a very powerful technique of attack (Douligeris and
Mitrokotsa, 2004, p.643). The recent rapid development of mobile technologies has also led to a growth
in their level of penetration. This growth also leads to a development of particular worms and other
malicious software (Stafford and Urbaczewski, 2004, p.292). All these new advancements also led to a
new type of DoS attack known as Low-rate DoS/DDoS attacks (Kuzmanovic and Knightly, 2003, p.75).
Low-rate DDoS sends attack traffic periodically to the target device which is completely different from
the traditional flooding DoS attack (Wu, et al., 2011, p.189). Various techniques for detection of the
traditional flooding DDoS has been discussed in the literature. This section is designed to discuss and
propose the use of the distance based similarity metric to detect a Low-rate DDoS attack. This metric
has been used by Rasmi and Jantan (2013) and who propose a new algorithm known as Similarity of
Attack Intentions (SAI) to estimate the similarity of cybercrime intentions for network forensics (p.542).
Another study found that using self-similarity algorithm to detect DDoS can be difficult but it is possible
(Brignoli, 2008, p.92).
Similarity has been used as the method for link predictions. For instance, x and y is assigned a score Sxy
which can be defined as proximity or similarity between x and y (Lü and Zhou, 2011, p.153). The
Similarity metric can be used in a more skilled approach such as using the node’s attributes to define
their similarity (Lin, 1998, p.298). Similarity has been used also to evaluate distances between nodes.
The shorter the path between nodes, the more similar they are (Resnik, 1995, p.448). Distance based
similarity metric is employed in this study to evaluate the similarity of the previous log file against the
current log file in order to determine if a DDoS attack has occurred. Bajcsy and Kovačič (1989) argued
that defining the problem will be the best way to fully understand the nature of the problem and what
to match, i.e., what are the features to be used in matching; what are the constraints we have to consider;
how to match, i.e., the matching process for achieving a consistent match; how to evaluate the match,
i.e., define the similarity measure (p.3).
Protocols
Attributes

HTTP, HTTPS, ICMP, TCP,
UDP, SYN, IRC
Time interval

Table 1. Characteristics of Low-rate DDoS.
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To evaluate the similarity between two different objects x and y, a distance metric known as Euclidean
Distance (EU) is used, which defines as follow:
𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 (𝑥𝑥, 𝑦𝑦) = �(𝑥𝑥 − 𝑦𝑦)2

(1)

This metric can also be generalized into n-dimensions points, such that a={x1, x2, … xn} and b={y1, y2, …,
yn}. In this case, n-dimensions EU metric is defined as:
𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 (𝑎𝑎, 𝑏𝑏) = �(𝑥𝑥1 − 𝑦𝑦1 )2 + (𝑥𝑥2 − 𝑦𝑦2 )2 + ⋯ + (𝑥𝑥𝑛𝑛 − 𝑦𝑦𝑛𝑛 )2
𝑛𝑛

= ��𝑖𝑖=1(𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 − 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖 )2

(2)

Let L1 and L2 be the existing log file and the current log file, respectively. Let xi represent each protocol
used in the existing log and yi represent the protocol used in the current log, where i={1, 2, …, n} and n
is the total number of protocols as shown in table 1. In this case, L1 ={x1, x2, …, xn} and L2 ={y1, y2, …, yn}.
Euclidean distance can be normalized into a distance based similarity as follow:
𝑆𝑆 =

1

(3)

1+𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸(𝐿𝐿1 ,𝐿𝐿2 )

Similarity normalized EU into a value in between 0 and 1, where a value of 1 means that the two objects
are identical and a value other than 1 means that the two objects are not identical.This study focuses on
detecting the DDoS attack and identifying the means of the attack. Various protocols can be engaged in
an attack such as it showed in table 1. In order to detect an attack, the similarity between the existing
and the current log files are ranked. In doing so, the Euclidean distance between L1 and L2 is calculated
first by using equation (1) and then the similarity can be ranked based on equation (3). Table 2, shows a
simple case of calculating the distance based similarity of various protocols that were used in an attack.
The sample data was taken from a live attack and then processed. Once the attack has been detected, the
protocol that was engaged in the attack needs to be identified. When the detection processes are
completed, a detailed report is developed for forensics. Table 2 illustrates the processes of distance based
similarity.

Protocol
s
L1
L2
EU(L1, L2)
S

HTTP

HTTPS

ICMP

TCP

UDP

SYN

IRC

x1=1000
y1=21000
20000
0.00005

x2=800
y2=1000
200
0.004

x3=600
y3=600
0
1

x4=2000
y4=3000
1000
0.001

x5=5000
y5=7000
2000
0.0005

x6=6000
y6=1000
5000
0.0002

x7=200
y7=500
300
0.03

Table 2. A simple case of distance based similarity ranking.

4.2 Traceback Using Mobile Forensic Techniques
Mobile phone forensics is described as the science of recovering digital evidence from a mobile phone
under forensically sound conditions using accepted methods (Curran, et al., 2010, p.1; Jansen and Ayers,
2007, p.4). Various digital forensics methods have been proposed by researchers around the world as a
technique to trace back DDoS attackers. For instance, “attack pattern” is a technique that can be used to
specify a generic way of performing an attack (Fernandez, et al., 2007, p.346). Guo and Lee (2010)
proposed the use of Network forensics analysis method which relies wholly on the analysis of the IDS
log files (p.294) Guo and Simon (2010) proposed an analytical model focusing on the analysis phase of
network forensics procedure. This model will help forensic investigators in looking for patterns to
determine if there is an anomaly in the traffic as result of an address spoofing flooding (ASF) attack. If
there is an ASF attack, the model will also help to determine the time of when the attack was launched
(p.135).
Kim and Kim (2011) proposed a Network Forensic Evidence Acquisition (NFEA) scheme with packet
marking that offers an effective tracking scheme that can help network forensics investigators to trace
back a DDoS attack to its origin. NFEA can guarantee the admissibility of the evidence acquired from
the edge routers (p.392). Huang and Huang (2013) also adopted the network forensics method to
investigate DDoS attack proposed Map (GHSOM) to look for variance in patterns of network traffic data
(p.536). It is evident in the literature that there is yet much to understand with regards to the use of
mobile forensics methods in the tracing back of DDoS attacks on mobile devices. The proposed trace
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back method is based on the life cycle of the bot as shown in figure 7 (Silva, et al., 2013, p.381). The
Initial Infection is the first phase where the device can be infected in several various ways. Provided that
the first phase was successfully executed, the second phase is a secondary injection where the
compromised device executes a program for malware binaries in a given network database (Silva, et al.,
2013, p.384).
Phase 2
Secondary Injection
Phase 3
Connection or Rally

Phase 1
Initial Injection

Phase 4
Malicious Activities
Phase 5
Maintenance &
Upgrading

Figure 7: the Botnet’s life cycle (adopted from Silva, et al., 2013, p.383)
The Malicious Activities phase allows the bots to communicate with the controller for instructions for
conducting activities such as such as spam, DDoS and scanning. The final phase is the Maintenance and
Upgrade. The bots continuously upgrades for various reasons such as, updating its codes to include
avoids detection or to add new features (Zhu, Z., et al., 2008, p.967). Our proposed method is shown in
figure 8, and the investigator methodology in figure 9. It is designed to take advantage of the botnet’s
life cycle and to use the attacker’s own strategy against the attacker (Mulliner and Seifert, 2010, p.76).
A malware will be placed in one or more of the bots in the botnet. When the attacker is returned to
maintain and upgrade the bots, the malware can replicate itself to the attacker’s device and it will reveal
the attacker’s location when the device is online (Polla, et al., 2013, p.448). Recently, hackers started
attacking mobile devices with various strategies and malware such as Botnets, Backdoors, Rootkits and
Trojans (Hsieh, et al., 2015, p.136). Symantec reported 2015 that in 2012, the main focus of mobile threat
is information theft. 2013 was spying on users by tracking GPS coordinates and recording calls etc. 2014
the focus was on stealing device data and spying on the users (Symantec, 2015, p.22; Mell, et al., 2007,
p.15). In terms of mobile devices, communication is the most important part of mobile botnet attack.
Mobile devices have limited resources such as battery, network bandwidth, etc (Mulliner and Seifert,
2010, p.76).
Command &
Control Packets

Low-Rate
DDoS Packets

Victim

Command &
Control
Botnet
Trace Back Packets

Low-rate attack packets
Persistent tracking cookies

Figure 8 CtC trace back & investigation method.
Mobile forensics is defined as the science of recovering digital evidences from a mobile device under
forensically sound conditions using accepted methods (Mumba and Venter, 2014, p.4). Mobile forensics
investigation process consists of 15 phases however, it is divided into three main processes. The
initialization process, the acquisition processes and the investigative processes. (Omeleze and Venter,
2013, p.5). The investigative processes consists of six processes. The Potential digital evidence
acquisition, digital evidence examination and analysis, digital evidence interpretation, reporting,
presentation and investigation closure (Mumba and Venter, 2014, p.4). The processes employed in this
study only concern the examination and analysis phase as illustrated in figure 9. The results will be used
by the CtC method to trace back the location of the attacker. These processes were designed not only to
eliminate the irrelevant data but assure the admissibility of the evidence in the court of law. The mobile
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forensics analysis process as illustrated in figure 9 starts with the data acquired from the victim’s device.
The data is used together with the reports from the similarity distance detection metric they can be
calculated as a continuous process or on previous log data.
Report from
similarity detection
START
Image from mobile
device

Identify similarity
results from the
image data

Similarity in
the data

NO

YES
Storage

Analyse packet
headers according to
similarity results

NO
Extract source IP
addreses

Found
evidence?

Further analysis &
start reconstructing
the attack path
YES
END

Prepare report

Figure 9: Mobile Low-rate DDoS forensics investigation process

5 Discussion
The foremost objective of mobile forensics method is to produce credible evidence of a crime committed
that can be used to prosecute perpetrator. In this paper, the distance based similarity metric is applied
to detect an attack from a slow DoS/DDoS onto a mobile device. The metric is also used to identify the
nature of the attack for instance, which layer of the OSI model was the attack based on. The dummy data
that we put through the metric to test the performance clearly showed when and where the slow DDOS
attack occurred. Murdock (2015) reported that 650,000 SMART phones in China were compromised to
launch an application layer DDoS attack. This attack generated 4.5 billion hits on the target (p.1). The
detection feature of the metric as explained in section 4.1 will run a comparison of the current log against
the benchmark log. When such an attack is detected then a closer look will be taken to identify the nature
of the attack as illustrated in figure 7. Once the attack is confirmed and the nature of the attack is
identified which in the above example is HTTP, a report is developed for forensics to start the
investigation and the trace back process.
In the simple case shown in table 2, L1 shows the total requests from each protocol on the existing log.
L2 shows the total requests from each protocol on the current log. EU(L1, L2) showed the results for
each protocol when Euclidean distance is used to evaluate L1 and L2. S shows the results from EU(L1,
L2) for each protocol after they have been normalized by similarity into a value in between 0 and 1. It is
evident in the simple case showed and computed in table 2, that distance based similarity effectively
improved the processes of detection, identification and investigation. This is due to the fact that the
metric can identify the nature of the attack. Forensics will acquire the data, examine and analyze only
the protocol(s) identified by the metric and start the attack path reconstruction process. Figure 9 is a
unique contribution that is designed to facilitate investigation processes. The flow diagram optimises
the use of information to guide a digital investigator through the use of the similarity metric. The
processes also assure forensically sound actions are taken and in a logical sequence that can be
reproduced and presented for a court of law.
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The application and computation of the similarity metric demonstrates its applicability to slow DDOS
attack detection. It provides an answer to the question of how can slow DDOS attacks be detected?; And
also opens further research into the applicability of this metric in diverse situations and under different
loadings. The potential is to automate the detection system based on live data and also for historical
data. As such the metric has value for both security and forensic activity around mobile phones. The
concept of disrupting mobile phone usage impacts the economic value and the social value of these
devices. DDOS attacks provide economic value to the service providers because the owners of the mobile
devices are locked into feepaying contracts of different descriptions. It is their phones and
communication systems are exploited and they are liable for the costs. However, ebusinesses can be
adversely affected when customers cannot get to their business opportunity or frustration levels reach a
point where the customer’s speak poorly of a particular service supplier. Similarly the disruption of
emergency services and other critical resources can result. The detection and disruption of this type of
attack is critical for the maintenance of confidence in mobile communication systems.

6 Conclusion
In this paper, distance based similarity metric is proposed as the method for detection and identification
of slow DoS/DDoS attacks. The Euclidean distance metric was used to evaluate the similarity between
the current and the benchmark logs. The distance based similarity metric was then used to normalize
the evaluation results into a value in the range of 0 and 1. The result from the simple case developed to
validate the method showed that the distance based similarity metric clearly detects and identify the
attack and its nature. It is also evident in this study that the metric also effectively improved the
performance, effectiveness and efficiency of the examination and analysis processes of the mobile
forensics investigation. For future work, a general algorithm for detection and identification of such an
attack under different conditions is being developed based on the distance based similarity metric. This
will be used on a larger DDoS dataset to further evaluate the algorithm for accuracy and reliability.
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